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Abstract - Current techniques for formally verifying circuits
implemented in Galois field (GF ) arithmetic are limited to
those with a known irreducible polynomial P (x). This paper
presents a computer algebra based technique that extracts the
irreducible polynomial P (x) used in the implementation of a
multiplier in GF(2m). The method is based on first extracting
a unique polynomial in Galois field of each output bit inde-
pendently. P (x) is then obtained by analyzing the algebraic
expression in GF(2m) of each output bit. We demonstrate
that this method is able to reverse engineer the irreducible
polynomial of an n-bit GF multiplier in n threads. Experiments
were performed on Mastrovito and Montgomery multipliers
with different P (x), including NIST-recommended polyno-
mials and optimal polynomials for different microprocessor
architectures.
Keywords— Reverse Engineering; Formal Verification; Galois Field
Arithmetic; Computer Algebra.
I. INTRODUCTION
Galois field (GF) arithmetic is used to implement critical
arithmetic components in communication and security-related
hardware. It has been extensively applied in many digital
signal processing and security applications, such as Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC), Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES), and others. Multiplication is one of the most heavily
used Galois field computations and is a complexity operation.
Specifically, in cryptography systems, the size of Galois field
circuits can be very large. Therefore, developing a general
formal analysis technique of Galois field arithmetic HW/SW
implementations becomes critical. Contemporary formal tech-
niques, such as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs), Boolean
Satisfiability (SAT), Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT),
etc., are not efficient to either the verification or reverse
engineering of Galois field arithmetic. The limitations of these
techniques when applied to Galois field arithmetic have been
addressed [1].
The elements in field GF(2m) can be represented using
polynomial rings. The field of size m is constructed us-
ing irreducible polynomial P (x), which includes terms with
degree d ∈ [0,m] and coefficients in GF(2). For example,
P (x)=x4 + x+1 is an irreducible polynomial in GF(24). The
multiplication in the field is performed modulo P (x). Theo-
retically, there is a large number of irreducible polynomials
available for constructing the field arithmetic operations in
GF(2m). However, the choice of irreducible polynomial has
great impact on the actual implementation of the resulting
GF circuits and the performance of field arithmetic operations.
The irreducible polynomials differ in the number of bit-level
XOR operations. It is believed that, in general, the irreducible
polynomial with minimum number of elements gives the best
performance [2]. However, a later work [3] demonstrates that
the best irreducible polynomial from circuit performance point
of view varies in different scenarios, and depends on a com-
puter architecture in which it is used, such as ARM vs. Intel-
Pentium. In other words, 1) for GF(2m) multiplication, each
irreducible polynomial results in a unique implementation;
and 2) for a fixed field size, there exist many irreducible
polynomials that could be used for constructing the field in
different applications. This provides the main motivation for
this work.
Computer algebra techniques with polynomial representa-
tions is believed to offer best solution for analyzing arithmetic
circuits [1][4][5][6]. These work address the verification prob-
lems of Galois field arithmetic and integer arithmetic imple-
mentations, including abstractions [4][5][6]. The verification
problem is typically formulated as proving that the implemen-
tation satisfies the specification. This task is accomplished by
performing a series of divisions of the specification polynomial
F by the implementation polynomials B, representing com-
ponents that implement the circuit. The techniques based on
Gro¨bner Basis demonstrate that this approach can efficiently
transform the verification problem to membership testing of
the specification polynomial in the ideals [1][5]. A different
approach to arithmetic verification of synthesized gate-level
circuits has been proposed, using algebraic rewriting technique,
which transforms polynomial of primary outputs to polynomial
of primary inputs [6]. The technique proposed in [1] has
been specifically applied to large GF(2m) arithmetic circuits.
However, the knowledge of irreducible polynomial is essential
to verify the implementations.
Symbolic computer algebra methods have also been used
to reverse engineer the word-level operations for GF circuits
and integer arithmetic circuits to speed up the verification
performance [7][8][9]. In the work of [7], the authors proposed
a original spectral method based on analyzing the internal
polynomial expressions during the rewriting procedure. Sayed-
Ahmed et al. [8] introduced a reverse engineering technique
in Algebraic Combinational Equivalence Checking (ACEC)
process using Gro¨bner Basis by converting the function into
canonical polynomials. However, both techniques are appli-
cable to integer arithmetic only. In [9], an abstraction tech-
nique is introduced by analyzing the polynomial representation
over GF (2m). However, similarly to [1], it is limited to the
2implementation with a known irreducible polynomial. In this
work, we present a method that is able to reverse engineer the
design by extracting the irreducible polynomial P (x) of the
GF(2m) multiplier, regardless of the GF(2m) algorithm used
(e.g. Mastrovito and Montgomery). This procedure auto-
matically checks the equivalence between the implementation
with a golden implementation constructed using the extracted
irreducible polynomial P (x).
II. BACKGROUND
Different variants of canonical, graph-based representations
have been proposed for arithmetic circuit verification, includ-
ing Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [10], Binary Moment
Diagrams (BMDs) [11], Taylor Expansion Diagrams (TED)
[12], and other hybrid diagrams. While the canonical dia-
grams have been used extensively in logic synthesis, high-
level synthesis and verification, their application to verify large
arithmetic circuits remains limited by the prohibitively high
memory requirement of complex arithmetic circuits [6][1].
Alternatively, arithmetic verification problems can be modeled
and solved using Boolean satisfiability (SAT) or satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT). However, it has been demonstrated
that these techniques cannot efficiently solve the verification
problem of large arithmetic circuits [1] [13]. Popular in in-
dustry are Theorem Provers, user-driven deductive systems
for proving that an implementation satisfies the specification,
using mathematical reasoning. However, Theorem Provers re-
quire manual guidance and in-depth domain knowledge, which
makes it difficult to be applied automatically.
A. Computer Algebra Approaches
The most advanced techniques that have potential to solve
the arithmetic verification problems are those based on sym-
bolic Computer Algebra. These methods model the arithmetic
circuit specification and its hardware implementation as poly-
nomials [1][4][6][9][14]. The verification goal is to prove
that implementation satisfies the specification by performing
a series of divisions of the specification polynomial F by
the implementation polynomials B = {f1, . . . , fs}, represent-
ing components that implement the circuit. The polynomials
f1, ..., fs are called the bases, or generators, of the ideal J .
Given a set f1, ..., fs of generators of J , a set of all simul-
taneous solutions to a system of equations f1=0; ...,fs=0 is
called a variety V (J). Verification problem is then formulated
as testing if the specification F vanishes on V (J). In some
cases, the test can be simplified to testing if F ∈ J , which is
known in computer algebra as ideal membership testing [1].
There are two basic techniques to reduce polynomial F
modulo B. A standard procedure to test if F ∈ J is to divide
polynomial F by the elements of B: {f1, ..., fs}, one by one.
The goal is to cancel, at each iteration, the leading term of F
using one of the leading terms of f1, ..., fs. If the remainder
of the division r is 0, then F vanishes on V (J), proving
that the implementation satisfies the specification. However,
if r 6= 0, such a conclusion cannot be made: B may not
be sufficient to reduce F to 0, and yet the circuit may be
correct. To check if F is reducible to zero, a canonical set of
generators, G = {g1, ..., gt}, called Gro¨bner basis is needed.
This technique has been successfully applied to Galois field
arithmetic [1] and integer arithmetic circuits [5].
Verification work of Galois field arithmetic has been pre-
sented in [1] [9]. These works provide significant improvement
compared to other techniques, since their formulations rely on
certain simplifying properties in Galois field during polynomial
reduction. Specifically, the problem reduces to the ideal mem-
bership testing over a larger ideal that includes J0 = 〈x2 −x〉
in F2. In this paper, we provide comparison between this
technique and our approach.
B. Function Extraction
Function extraction is an arithmetic verification method
originally proposed in [6] for integer arithmetic circuits, in
Z2m . It extracts a unique bit-level polynomial function imple-
mented by the circuit directly from its gate-level implemen-
tation. Extraction is done by backward rewriting, i.e., trans-
forming the polynomial representing encoding of the primary
outputs (called the output signature) into a polynomial at the
primary inputs (the input signature). This technique has been
successfully applied to large integer arithmetic circuits, such as
512-bit integer multipliers. However, it cannot be directly ap-
plied to large GF multipliers because of exponential size of the
intermediate number of polynomial terms before cancellations
during rewriting. Fortunately, arithmetic GF (2m) circuits offer
an inherent parallelism which can be exploited in backward
rewriting.
In the rest of the paper, we first show how to apply such
parallel rewriting in GF (2m) circuits while avoiding memory
explosion experienced in integer arithmetic circuits. Using this
approach, we extract the function of each output element in
F2m and the function is represented in algebraic expression
where all variables are Boolean. Finally, we propose a method
to reverse engineer the GF designs by extracting the irreducible
polynomial P (x) by analyzing these expressions.
C. Galois Field Multiplication
Galois field (GF) is an algebraic system with a finite number
of elements and two main arithmetic operations, addition and
multiplication; other operations can be derived from those two
[15]. Galois field with p elements is denoted as GF (p). The
most widely-used finite fields are Prime Fields and Extension
Fields, and particularly binary extension fields. Prime field,
denoted GF (p), is a finite field consisting of finite number
of integers {1, 2, ...., p − 1}, where p is a prime number,
with additions and multiplication performed modulo p. Binary
extension field, denoted GF (2m) (or F2m), is a finite field with
2m elements. Unlike in prime fields, however, the operations
in extension fields are not computed modulo 2m. Instead, in
one possible representation (called polynomial basis), each
element of GF (2m) is a polynomial ring with m terms with the
coefficients in GF (2). Addition of field elements is the usual
addition of polynomials, with coefficient arithmetic performed
modulo 2. Multiplication of field elements is performed mod-
ulo irreducible polynomial P (x) of degree m and coefficients
3in GF (2). The irreducible polynomial P (x) is analog to the
prime number p in prime fields GF (p). Extension fields are
used in many cryptography applications, such as AES and
ECC. In this work, we focus on the verification problem of
GF (2m) multipliers.
Two different GF multiplication structures constructed using
different irreducible polynomials P1(x) and P2(x), are shown
in Figure 1. The integer multiplication takes two n-bit operands
as input and generates a 2n-bit word, where the values
computed at lower significant bits are carried through the carry
chain all the way to the most significant bit (MSB). In contrast,
there is no carry propagation in GF(2m) implementations.
To represent the result in GF (24), the result of the integer
multiplication have to be reduced in GF (24) to only four
output bits. The result of such a reduction is shown in Figure 1.
In GF(24), the input and output operands are represented using
polynomials A(x), B(x) and Z(x), where A(x)=
∑n=3
n=0 an·x
n
,
B(x)=
∑n=3
n=0 bn · x
n
, Z(x)=
∑n=3
n=0 zn · x
n
.
The functions of si (i ∈ [0, 6]) are represented
using polynomials in GF (2), namely: s0=a0b0,
s1=a1b0+a0b1, up to s6=a3b31. The outputs zn (n ∈
[0, 3]) are computed modulo the irreducible polynomial
P (x). Using P2(x)=x4+x+1, we obtain : z0=s0+s4,
z1=s1+s4+s5, z2=a0b2+a1b1+a2b0+a2b3+a3b2+a3b3, and
z3=a0b3+a1b2+a2b1+a3b0+a3b3. In digital circuits, partial
products are implemented using AND gates, and addition
modulo 2 is done using XOR gates. Note that, unlike in integer
multiplication, in GF (2m) circuits there is no carry out to
the next bit. For this reason, as we can see in Figure 1, the
function of each output bit can be computed independently of
other bits.
a3 a2 a1 a0
b3 b2 b1 b0
a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0
a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1
a3b2 a2b2 a1b2 a0b2
a3b3 a2b3 a1b3 a0b3
s6 s5 s4 s3 s2 s1 s0
P (x)1=x
4 + x3 + 1
s3 s2 s1 s0
s4 0 0 s4
s5 0 s5 s5
s6 s6 s6 s6
z3 z2 z1 z0
P (x)2=x
4 + x+ 1
s3 s2 s1 s0
0 0 s4 s4
0 s5 s5 0
s6 s6 0 0
z3 z2 z1 z0
Fig. 1: Two GF(24) multiplications constructed using P (x)1=x4 +
x
3 + 1 and P (x)2=x4 + x+ 1.
D. Irreducible Polynomials
For constructing the field GF (2m), the irreducible poly-
nomial can be either a trinomial, xm+xa+1, or a pentanomial
xm+xa+xb+xc+1 [16]. In [16], it is stated that the pentanomial
is chosen as irreducible polynomial only if an irreducible
trinomial doesn’t exist. In order to obtain efficient GF mul-
tiplication algorithm, it is required that m - a ≥ w. However,
1For polynomials in GF (2), ”+” is computed as modulo 2.
the work of [3] demonstrates that the trinomials are not always
better than pentanomials. It means that for a given field size,
there could be various irreducible polynomials used in different
implementations.
An example of constructing GF (24) multiplication using
two different irreducible polynomials is shown in Figure 1.
We can see that each polynomial corresponds to a unique
multiplication. The performance difference can be evaluated
by counting the XOR operations in each multiplication. Since
the number of AND and XOR operations for generating partial
products (variables si in Fig. 1) is always the same, the
difference is only caused by the reduction of the corresponding
polynomials modulo P (x). The number of XOR operations in
reduction process can be counted as the number of terms in
each column minus one. For example, the number of XORs
using P1(x) is 3+1+2+3=9; and using P2(x), the number of
XORs is 1+2+2+1=6.
As will be shown in the next section, given the structure of
the GF (2m) multiplication, such as shown in Figure 1, one can
immediatelly identify the irreducible polynomial P (x). This
can be done by extracting the terms sk corresponding to the
entry sm (here s4) in the table and generating the irreducible
polynomial beyond xm. We know that P (x) must contain
xm, and the remaining terms xk are obtained from the non-
zero terms corresponding to the entry sm. For the irreducible
polynomial P1(x) = x4 + x3 + x0, the terms x3 and x0 are
obtained by noticing the placement of s4 in columns z3 and
z0. Similarly, for P2(x) = x4 + x1 + x0, the terms x1 and x0
are obtained by noticing that s4 is placed in columns z1 and
z0. The reason for it and the details of this procedure will be
explained in the next section.
III. APPROACH
A. Computer Algebraic model
In this approach, the circuit is modeled as a network of logic
elements, including: basic logic gates (AND, OR, XOR, INV),
and complex standard cell gates (AOI, OAI, etc.) obtained by
synthesis and technology mapping. The following algebraic
equations are used to describe basic logic gates in GF (2m)
[1]:
¬a = 1 + a mod 2
a ∧ b = a · b mod 2
a ∨ b = a + b + a · b mod 2
a⊕ b = a + b mod 2
(1)
B. Outline of the Approach
Similarly to the work of [6], the computed function of
the circuits is specified by two polynomials, referred to as
output signature and input signature. The output signature of
a GF (2m) multiplier is defined as Sigout =
∑m−1
i=0 zix
i
, and
zi ∈ GF (2). The input signature of a GF (2m) multiplier
is Sigin =
∑m−1
i=0 Pix
i
, with coefficients (product terms)
Pi ∈ GF (2), and addition operation performed modulo 2.
As discussed in Section II and shown in Figure 1, given an
irreducible polynomial P (x), the input signature Sigin can be
computed easily in GF (2m). The goal of verification is first
to transform the output signature, Sigout, using polynomial
4representation of the internal logic elements, into Sigin and
then check if Sigin = Sigout. The following theorem is
adopted from [6], where it was initially applied to integer
arithmetic circuits in Z2m .
Theorem 1 (Correctness): Given a combinational
GF (2m) arithmetic circuit, composed of logic gates, described
by polynomial expressions (Eq. 1), the input signature Sigin
computed by backward rewriting is unique and correctly
represents the function implemented by the circuit in GF (2m).
Proof: The proof relies on the fact that each transformation
step (rewriting iteration) is correct. That is, each internal
signal is represented by an algebraic expression, which always
evaluates to a correct value in GF (2m). This is guaranteed
by the correctness of the algebraic model in Eq. (1), which
can be proved by inspection. The correctness of the computed
signature can be proved by induction on i, the step of trans-
forming polynomial Fi into Fi+1. Assuming that F0=Sigout,
and each Fi ∈ GF (2m), it is easy to show that Fi+1 remains
in GF (2m), where each variable in Fi represents output of
some logic gate. During the rewriting process, this variable is
substituted by a corresponding polynomial in GF (2m). Hence,
the resulting polynomial Fi+1 correctly represents the function
Fi+1 ∈ GF (2
m). Proof of the uniqueness of the computed
signature follows the same reasoning. 
Algorithm 1 Backward Rewriting in GF (2m)
Input: Gate-level netlist of GF (2m) multiplier
Input: Output signature Sigout
Output: algebraic expression of given Sigout
1: P={p0, p1, ..., pn}: polynomials representing gate-level netlist
2: F0=Sigout
3: for each polynomial pi ∈ P do
4: for output variable v of pi in Fi do
5: replace every variable v in Fi by the expression of pi
6: Fi → Fi+1
7: for each element/monomial M in Fi+1 do
8: if the coefficient of M%2==0
9: or M is constant, M%2==0 then
10: remove M from Fi+1
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
15: return Fn
The rewriting process is described in Algorithm 1. During
the rewriting, the polynomial is simplified by applying mod 2
reduction to all its terms. This is unlike in Z2m case, where
some terms (with opposite signs) would cancel each other.
The rewriting algorithm takes the gate-level netlist of a
GF (2m) circuit as input and first converts each logic gate
into equations using Eq. (1). The rewriting process starts with
F0 = Sigout, proceeds in a topological order of the netlist,
and ends when all the variables in Fi are all primary inputs.
Each iteration includes two steps: Step 1) (lines 4-6 of the
Algorithm) substitute the variable of the gate output using the
expression in the inputs of the gate (Eq.1), and name the new
expression Fi+1 ; Step 2) (line 4 and lines 8-10) simplify the
new expression by removing all the monomials and constants
that evaluate to 0 in GF (2). The algorithm outputs the function
of the design in GF (2m) after n iterations, where n is the
number of gates in the netlist.
s0s2p0p1
s1
z1 z0
a1 a0b1 b0a1b0a0b1
s2s2
G6G5G4G3
G2
G1 G0
Fig. 2: 2-bit multiplier over GF (22) with irreducible polynomial
P (x) = x2 + x+ 1.
In addition to verifying the design by comparing the com-
puted polynomial Fn with Sigout, the expressions of Fn will
be used to extract the irreducible polynomial and perform the
verification.
An important observation is that the cancellations of poly-
nomial terms take place only within the expression associated
with the same degree of polynomial ring (Sigout is a poly-
nomial ring). In other words, the cancellations resulting the
polynomial reduction happen in a logic cone of every output bit
independently of other bits, regardless of logic sharing between
the cones.
Theorem 2 (Parallelizability): Given a GF (2m) multiplier
with Sigout = F0 = z0x0 + z1x1 + ... + zmxm; and Fi=E0x0
+ E1x
1 + ... + Emx
m
, where Ei is an algebraic expression
in GF (2) obtained during rewriting. Then, the polynomial
reduction is possible only within a single expression Ei, for
i=1, 2, ..., m.
Proof: Consider a polynomial Eixni+Ekxnk , where Ei and
Ek are simplified in GF (2). That is, Ei = (e1i + e2i + ...),
and Ek = (e1k + e2k + ...). After simplifying each of the two
polynomials, there are no common monomials between Eixni
and Ekxnk . This is because for any element, elixni 6= e
j
kx
nk
,
for any pairs of (i, k) and (l, j). 
sigout=z0+xz1
Sigout0=z0 elim Sigout1=x·z1 elim
G0: s0+s2 - G0: z1x -
G1: s0+s2 - G1: (s1+1+s2)x -
G2: s0+s2 - G2: (p0+p1+s2)x+x -
G3: s0+s2 - G3: (1+a0b1+p0+s2)x+x 2x
G4: s0+s2 - G4: (a0b1+1+a1b0+s2)x -
G5: s0+1+a1b1 - G5: (a0b1+a1b0+1+a1b1)x+x 2x
G6: 1+a0b0+a1b1+1 2 G6: x(a1b1+a1b0+a0b1)+2x 2x
z0=a0b0+a1b1, z1=a1b1+a1b0+a0b1
Fig. 3: Extracting the algebraic expression of z0 and z1 in Figure 2.
Example 1 (Figure 2): We illustrate our method using a
post-synthesized 2-bit multiplier in GF (22), shown in Fig-
ure 2. The irreducible polynomial of this design is P (x)
= x2 + x + 1. The goal is to extract algebraic expressions
of z0 and z1 by rewriting polynomials from the primary
outputs to primary inputs, which is done in parallel (z0 and
z1 are rewritten in two threads). The first two transformations
5rewrite G0 and G1. After this, z0 is rewritten to s0+s2, and
z1 is rewritten to s1x+s2x+x. In the rewriting process, we
can see that the polynomial reduction happen when there are
monomials that are not in GF(2). For example, during the 4th
iteration of rewriting z1, monomial 2x is eliminated. Also, we
can see that the reductions happen only within the logic cone
of each output bit, as proved in Theorem 2.
In the following, the out-filed products are the products aibj ,
such that i + j≥m. Since these products are associated with
bits si+j , they are reduced by P (x).
Theorem 3: Given a multiplication in GF(2m), let the first
out-field product set be Pm. Then, the irreducible polynomial
P (x) includes xm , and xi iff all products in set Pm exist in
the algebraic expression of the ith output bits, where i ≤ m.
Proof: Based on the definition of field arithmetic, the
polynomial basis representation of Pm is Pmxm. To reduce
Pm into elements in the range [0, m − 1] (with m output
bits), the field reductions are performed modulo irreducible
polynomial P (x) with highest degree of m. Based on the
definition of irreducible polynomial, P (x) is either a trinomial
or a pentanomial with degree of m. Let P (x) be xm+P ′(x).
Then,
Pmx
m
mod (xm + P ′(x)) = PmP
′(x)
Hence, if xi exists in P ′(x), it also exists in P (x).

Example 2 (Figure 2): We illustrate the method of reverse
engineering the irreducible polynomial using the 2-bit multi-
plier in GF (22), shown in Figure 2. The algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 2. Using the rewriting technique (Algorithm 1)
based on Theorem 1 and 2, we can extract the algebraic
expressions of z0=a0b0, and z1x = (a0b1+a1b0+a1b1)x, hence
z1=a0b1+a1b0+a1b1 (lines 3 - 5). In this example, m=2, hence
P3={a1b1}. We can see that both expressions of z0 and z1
include P3, which means that x0 and x1 are included in the
irreducible polynomial of this design (lines 6 - 7). Based on
Theorem 4, we know that xm is always included (line 2).
Hence, irreducible polynomial of this design is P (x)=x2+x+1
(m=2) (line 10).
Algorithm 2 Extracting irreducible polynomial in GF (2m)
Input: Gate-level netlist/equations of GF (2m) multiplier
Output: Irreducible polynomial P (x)
1: Pm={am−1b1, am−2b2 , ..., a1bm−1}
2: P (x)=xm: initialize irreducible polynomial
3: for each output bit zi do
4: apply Algorithm1 Backward rewrite(netlist/equations, zi)
5: EXPi ← Backward rewrite(netlist, zi)
6: if Pm exits in EXPi then
7: P (x) += xi
8: end if
9: end for
10: return P (x)
IV. RESULTS
The technique described in this paper was implemented
in C++. It reverse engineers the irreducible polynomials of
GF(2m) multiplications by analyzing the algebraic expressions
of each element. The program was tested on a number of
combinational gate-level GF (2m) multipliers with different
irreducible polynomials including Montgomery multipliers and
Mastrovito multipliers. The multiplier generators are taken
from [1]. It shows that our technique can successfully re-
verse engineer the irreducible polynomials of various designs,
regardless of the GF(2m) algorithm. The experiments were
conducted on a PC with Intel(R) Xeon CPU E5-2420 v2 2.20
GHz x12 with 32 GB memory.
We first evaluate our approach using Montgomery and
Mastrovito multipliers that are implemented using NIST-
recommended irreducible polynomials [16]. The experimental
results of Mastrovito multipliers with bit-width varying from
64 to 571 bits is shown in Table I and results of Montgomery
multipliers with bit-width varying from 64 to 283 bits is shown
in Table II. Note that we use the flattened version Montgomery
multipliers, i.e. we have no knowledge of the block boundaries.
The bit-width m of the GF(2m) multiplier is shown in the
first column. The irreducible polynomials used for constructing
those multipliers are shown in the second column. The number
of equations that represent the implementation is in the third
column; it is also the number of iterations of extracting the
polynomial expression of each output bit.
Our program takes the netlist/equations of the GF(2m) im-
plementations, and the number of threads as inputs. Hence, the
users can adjust the parallel effort depending on the hardware
resource. In this work, all results are performed in 16 threads.
The results in Table I and Table II show that the proposed
technique can extract the irreducible polynomial P (x) of large
multipliers, regardless of the GF algorithm.
bit-width m Irreducible polynomial P(x) # eqns Extraction in 16 threadsRuntime(s) Mem
64 x64+x21+x19+x4+1 21,814 9.2 37 MB
96 x96+x44+x7+x2+1 51,412 13.4 86 MB
163 x163+x80+x47+x9+1 153,245 158.9 253 MB
233 x233+x74+1 167,803 244.9 1.5 GB
283 x283+x12+x7+x5+1 399,688 704.5 4.5 GB
409 x409+x87+1 508,507 1324.7 8.3 GB
571 x571+x10+x5+x2+1 1628,170 4089.9 27.1 GB
TABLE I: Results of reverse engineering irreducible polynomials of
Mastrovito multipliers using NIST-recommended polynomials.
bit-width m Irreducible polynomial P(x) # eqns Extraction in 16 threadsRuntime(s) Mem
64 x64+x21+x19+x4+1 16.898 42.2 30 MB
96 x96+x44+x7+x2+1 37,634 228.2 119 MB
163 x163+x80+x47+x9+1 107,582 1614.8 2.6 GB
233 x233+x74+1 219,022 461.1 4.8 GB
283 x283+x12+x7+x5+1 322,622 21520.0 7.8 GB
409 x409+x87+1 672,396 - MO
TABLE II: Results of reverse engineering irreducible polynomials
of Montgomery multipliers using NIST-recommended polynomials.
MO=Out of 32 GB
We also apply our technique in the bit-optimized multipliers
(Table III). The multipliers are optimized and mapped using
synthesis tool ABC [17]. Comparing Table III with Tables I
and II, we can see that it takes much less runtime and memory
to extract the irreducible polynomials of the bit-optimized
multipliers rather than the non-optimized multipliers. This is
because the GF multipliers are implemented without carry
chain. As long as the logic cone of each output bit can be
6m Irreducible polynomial Mastrovito-syn Montgomery-synRuntime(s) Mem Runtime(s) Mem
64 x64+x21+x19+x4+1 12.8 25 MB 5.2 20 MB
163 x163+x80+x47+x9+1 67.6 508 MB 221.4 610 MB
233 x233+x74+1 149.6 1.2 GB 154.4 2.9 GB
409 x409+x87+1 821.6 6.5 GB 855.4 10.3 GB
TABLE III: Results of extracting irreducible polynomial of opti-
mized GF(2m) Mastrovito and Montgomery multipliers.
reduced, the complexity of extracting the polynomial expres-
sions becomes easier.
One observations is that in Table II, extracting P (x) of
GF(2163) multiplier requires four times runtime of extracting
P (x) of GF(2233) multiplier. The reason is that the com-
plexity of the GF multiplication using different irreducible
polynomials can be very different. The results shown in Table
IV compare the performance of extracting the irreducible
polynomials of GF(2233) Mastrovito multipliers for different
P (x). Those multipliers are implemented with the polynomials
shown in Table IV, which are optimal irreducible polynomials
for different computer architectures [3]. We can see that the
runtime varies from 233 seconds to 546 seconds, and memory
usage varies from 4.8 GB to 11.7 GB. This is because, for
different P (x), the total number of XOR operations can be
very different, e.g. as for the GF(24) multiplications discussed
in Section II-D.
Optimal P(x) in GF(2233) Runtime(s) Mem
Intel-Pentium x233+x201+x105+x9+1 546.7 11.7 GB
ARM x233+x159+1 233.7 5.1 GB
MSP430 x233+x185+x121+x105+1 511.2 10.9 GB
NIST-recommended x233+x74+1 244.9 4.8 GB
TABLE IV: Results of extracting irreducible polynomial of GF(2233)
Mastrovito multipliers implemented using different P (x).
The complexity of extracting irreducible polynomial is eval-
uated using the runtime of extracting polynomial expression of
each output bit, and finding Pm (Algorithm 2). The analysis
results shown in Figure 4 are based on the GF(2233) multipliers
used in Table IV. The x-axis represents the output bit position,
and the y-axis shows the runtime of extracting polynomial
expression and finding Pm.
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Fig. 4: Runtime of extracting polynomial expressions of each output
bit of GF(2233) multipliers included in Table IV.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a computer algebra based technique that
extracts the irreducible polynomial used in the implementation
of a multiplier with a given GF(2m). The method is based
on analyzing the unique polynomial expressions of the output
bits in Galois field. The experimental results show that our
technique is able to extract the irreducible polynomial up
to 571-bit GF multipliers, regardless of the implementation.
We analyze the runtime complexity using various irreducible
polynomials.
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